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Summary 
Urban planning policies in Australia presuppose apartments as the 
new dominant housing type, but much of what the market has 
delivered is criticised as over-development, and as being generic, 
poorly-designed, environmentally unsustainable and unaffordable. 
Policy responses to this problem typically focus on planning regulation 
and construction costs as the primary issues needing to be addressed 
in order to increase the supply of quality, affordable apartment 
housing. In contrast, this paper uses Ball’s (1983) ‘structures of 
provision’ approach to outline the key processes informing apartment 
development and identifies a substantial gap in critical understanding 
of how apartments are developed in Australia. This reveals economic 
problems not typically considered by policymakers. 
Using mainstream economic analysis to review the market itself, we 
find high search costs, demand risk, problems with exchange, and lack 
of competition present key barriers to achieving greater affordability 
of apartments and limit the extent to which ‘speculative’ developers 
can respond to the preferences of would-be owner-occupiers. The 
existing development model, which is reliant on capturing uplift in site 
value, suits investors seeking rental yields in the first instance, and 
subsequently capital gains, and actively encourages housing price 
inflation. This is exacerbated by lack of density restrictions, such as has 
been the case in inner Melbourne for many years, which permits 
greater yields on redevelopment sites. The price of land in the vicinity 
of such redevelopment sites is pushed up as landholders' expectation 
of future yield is raised. All too frequently, existing redevelopment 
sites go back onto the market as vendors seek to capture the uplift in 
site value and exit the project in a risk-free manner. 
 
This paper proposes three major reforms, which together would 
enable development of better, more affordable apartments for 
housing consumers: 
§ Firstly, that the market for apartment development be re-designed, 
following insights from the economic field of ‘Market Design’ (a 
branch of Game Theory). A two-sided matching market for new 
apartments is proposed, where demand-side risks can be mitigated 
via consumer aggregation.  
§ Secondly, consumers should be empowered through support for 
‘deliberative’ and ‘do-it-yourself’ (DIY) development models, in 
order to increase competition, expand access, and promote 
responsiveness to consumer needs and preferences. A ‘Smart 
Housing Market’ is proposed to broker the necessary connections 
and simplify the process. 
§ Finally, planning schemes need to impose density restrictions (in 
the form of height limits, floor space ratios or bedroom quotas, for 
example) in localities where housing demand is high, in order to 
dampen speculation and de-risk development by creating certainty. 
Restrictions on over-development on larger infill sites can be offset 
by permitting intensification of ‘greyfield’ suburbs. Aggregating 
existing housing lots to enable precinct regeneration with 
moderate height and density increases would permit better use of 
airspace thus allowing design outcomes that can optimise land use 
while retaining neighbourhood amenity. 
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Apartment Development 
Supply and affordability 
The need for major Australian cities to move to more apartment 
living has been widely recognised in planning policy. Higher density 
development has long been promoted in metropolitan strategic 
planning as a means to accommodate population and household 
growth efficiently and to support well-serviced urban precincts. 
Apartment living is also recognised as a necessary part of transition to 
sustainability at regional scale. 
Despite several important periods of apartment development in 
Australia’s history, notably the years preceding and following World 
War Two, this form of housing has not been a major part of 
Australian urban life. Over the last decade, however, many places, 
including metropolitan Melbourne, have experienced a significant 
increase in apartment supply. For the first time, more apartment units 
are being built in the Melbourne metropolitan region than detached 
houses, although this recent spate of development has been building 
from a low base. 
A sizeable part of new apartment supply is driven by the emergence 
of a global market for apartments as a channel for the transfer of 
international capital. In this context, the role of new housing 
production as an investment vehicle needs to be balanced carefully 
with addressing the housing needs of the local population and 
securing an appropriate housing legacy for future generations. To this 
end, new supply needs to be good quality, to cater to the diversity of 
housing need and be broadly affordable. 
 
Housing price inflation, particularly in Sydney and Melbourne, has 
contributed to a serious decline in the number of low and middle 
income households able to purchase housing. In part, asset inflation 
reflects housing supply lagging well behind demand. The promotion of 
higher density housing as a component of urban consolidation 
policies, however, has delivered less supply than required and has 
failed to be affordable. It is also often criticised for poor design and 
quality.  
Planning and other regulation is often cited as a significant cost driver 
for medium and higher density infill housing. The response in 
Melbourne has been a laissez-faire approach to planning in the central 
city and use of the Minister for Planning’s call-in powers to expedite 
development proposals, with approval for considerable increases in 
height and/or density. 
In this section of the paper, we adopt Ball’s (1986) ‘structures of 
housing provision’ approach, to provide an outline of the apartment 
development process as it typically is undertaken in Australia. Again 
following Ball, we use a mainstream economics frame to then critique 
this delivery model, highlighting: 
§ The risk profile of vertical sub-division of land versus horizontal 
sub-division of airspace (thinking of apartments in terms of 
development typology rather than built form typologies) 
§ The role of project costs in determining project viability, but not 
market price 
§ Project margins and development finance 
§ The role of planning in fostering land speculation and thus 
contributing to declining housing affordability 
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§ The costs associated with obtaining sales and the risk associated 
with uncertain demand and, 
§ The inadequacy of pre-sale contracts to mitigate settlement risk. 
We argue that a significant problem for the supply and affordability of 
apartments relates to the current inability of the market to match 
supply and demand efficiently in order to progress an orderly and de-
risked development process. 
 
Apartment ‘provision’ 
The ‘structures of provision’ approach articulated by Michael Ball is 
used here to understand empirically and conceptually how apartments 
are provided, rather than simply produced.  
Creating and building built structures invokes particular sets of social 
agents defined by their economic relation to the physical process of 
provision itself. Each historically specific set of social agents can be 
defined as a structure of building provision. By provision is meant the 
production, exchange, distribution, and use of a built structure. Involved 
may be a landowner, a developer, a building firm, building workers, 
financiers, building owners, and final users. (Ball 1986: 455) 
To date policy analysis has focused strongly on production (the cost 
and availability of land, for example) and to a lesser extent on 
consumption (for instance, how growth in wages results in price 
inflation). These are important but do not tell the full story. Burke and 
Hulse (2010) identify the following housing sub-systems, which fit with 
Ball’s structures of provision approach, and capture conceptually the 
components of the housing system that assists with understanding the 
development process.  
Production 
§ The nature and techniques of land ownership, land assembly and 
housing development; 
Consumption 
§ The forms and methods by which households consume housing; 
Exchange 
§ The practices and institutions which facilitate the sale, renting and 
use of housing; and 
Management 
§ The practices by which the housing system is managed, including 
policy and planning at all levels of government (including 
regulation, taxation, transfer payments, borrowings, direct 
provision, etc.) 
As we proceed, we highlight previously unexplored issues concerning 
the exchange sub-system, by examining the role of presales and 
settlement, and the management sub-system through land title and 
consumer law. 
 
The development process 
The first step in understanding why the market has failed to deliver 
affordable, quality apartments is appreciating that apartments have a 
structure of provision that is distinct both from both detached 
dwellings and other forms of multi-unit dwellings such as townhouses. 
The starting point is in understanding the difference between the 
horizontal and vertical sub-division of airspace. Horizontal subdivision 
creates horizontal layers in the airspace above the physical land, 
creating apartments for example.  In contrast, vertical subdivision 
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maintains its links with the physical land subdividing the original lot 
into smaller land sub-parcels (such as for townhouses).  The different 
subdivision type affects the size, complexity and risk of the 
development project and these factors intrinsically impact the 
structure of provision for apartments.  We contend that it is access to 
finance (or lack thereof) and financial risk, which are the key 
differentiating factor in the structure of provision for apartments.  
Projects comprising vertical subdivision, such as where townhouses 
replace a single house on a single residential lot, are generally small-
scale projects that are constrained in size and value by the type of 
development finance small developers can access. In this subdivision 
development model, the underlying land value is used as security 
against borrowings and the quantum and characteristics of the loan 
reflects the undeveloped or raw value of the site rather than the total 
anticipated cost or value of the finished project. This means that the 
requisite construction loans are often secured against other assets of 
the borrower such as the family home of the small developer 
(Weaver and Kingsley 2001). The net asset backing of the small 
developer (the borrower) therefore limits how much can be 
borrowed and thus the scale of the project able to be undertaken. 
Smaller scale projects are often seen as lower risk by financiers by 
virtue of the intrinsic (and realisable) value in the underlying land 
should the financier need to sell assets to recoup its loan, the project 
needing fewer buyers to generate the income to repay the loan, and 
the relatively short project time frames involved. These are 
uncomplicated loan structures, generally negotiated at a local bank 
branch level. This mainstream bank finance has replaced solicitor's 
funds used during the 1960s and 1970s for the building of flats (Burke 
2012).  
Projects involving horizontal subdivision, on the other hand, are by 
definition multi-storey complexes with apartments on each level. 
Titles to the apartments are created in a stratum, that is, in the 
airspace above the land by virtue of the construction of a building 
thereupon. Creation of a new airspace ‘lot’ is thus a much riskier 
process, and it is these additional risks that require further 
examination when considering firstly the structure of provision for 
apartments, and secondly when envisioning an alternative structure of 
provision from that which has existed in Australia for several decades.  
When considering risks, we first consider why financiers introduce a 
wider range of security instruments to protect their funds in 
apartment development. The financier is concerned with the 
considerable financial gap between the raw value of the land and the 
total cost of developing the airspace. The long and often uncertain 
time period between project inception and completion makes this 
form of development a relatively high-risk financing venture. As with 
the smaller projects, the development site itself is used as initial 
security for the loan that is required to complete the project. 
However, the quantum and conditions of the development finance 
reflects the anticipated overall cost or value of the end project, thus 
allowing for a substantially larger loan and hence a larger project to be 
constructed. 
Developers of apartment projects tend to have corporate business 
structures and a professional staff (Dowling 2005). Reflecting 
diversification out of the non-residential construction sector (Dowling 
2005), these developers use building practices and technologies 
similar to those employed in commercial developments, using 
unionised workforces and operating with higher overheads and 
margins, reflecting economies of scale. The apartment developer 
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usually provides little personal security for the loans, with loans 
secured only against the project in many instances, or against other 
company assets (Weaver and Kingsley 2001). As Ball (1998: 1505) 
notes, it is the financier who bears most of the costs of failure 
whereas the developer ‘reaps virtually all the gain…’ if ‘…the gamble 
comes off’.  
The ‘gamble’ here refers to the investment of millions of dollars of 
financier’s funds to build an apartment building, in the hope that there 
will be willing buyers for those apartments upon completion. To 
mitigate this risk in Australia, research is used to forecast the strength 
of consumer demand for the apartments to be built, and 'pre-sales' 
are used by developers and financiers alike to confirm market 
acceptance of the product type and the price point on offer (Bryant 
2012). Loan terms dictate that construction finance is not released 
until sufficient pre-sales are achieved to cover repayment the loan, 
which can be many months or years, often making it more time-
consuming than statutory approval processes. Pre-sale campaigns are 
also expensive, comprising up to10% of total project costs (Sharam et 
al. 2015).   
The pre-sale process has been used as a risk mitigation measure for 
financiers and developers in Australia in the past few decades, 
enabling larger projects to proceed. However, and in addition to the 
considerable cost of obtaining pre-sales, the pre-sale contract is an 
imperfect security instrument for all parties involved. Larger 
developments typically take many years from inception to completion, 
with many critical hurdles along the way (Millington 2013; Rowley and 
Phibbs 2012). As such, a number of years can elapse between a pre-
sale and settlement, which may correspond to a shift in market 
conditions and demand. Any apartments not pre-sold can represent a 
windfall for the developer who takes the uplift in value in a rising 
market. But unsold apartments can also be a considerable risk, and 
slow post-completion sales can strip a developer of project profit in a 
falling market. Pre-selling for housing, as Burke and Hulse (2010) 
suggests, dampens property speculation but a significant proportion of 
apartments in Australia are not pre-sold, so speculation (on capital 
growth) is still a significant driver of projects. 
Although a pre-sale contract theoretically binds the purchaser, 
purchasers are inclined to 'walk away' (losing their deposit, which in 
Australia is a maximum of 10% of the sale price) if the value of the 
apartment falls significantly between contract and completion, such as 
in a weak or falling market. This may occur particularly if mortgage 
lenders withdraw their offer of finance, with little practical recourse 
available to the developer. While legal remedy is technically available 
it is generally not cost effective. This 'settlement risk' is addressed by 
developers and financiers through a number of means, such as vetting 
purchasers to establish whether there is risk of default at settlement, 
restricting the purchase of multiple dwellings, and in some cases 
limiting the level of foreign investment (Burke and Associates 2010).  
Apartment projects are also risky as they generally receive no positive 
cashflow for the duration of the project until completion, unlike 
greenfield or townhouse development, which can be staged to deliver 
incremental revenue. This characteristic of apartment development 
leaves both developer and financier highly exposed until the project is 
completed, the new titles created and pre-sold apartments settled. 
State-based legislation requires pre-sale deposits to be held in trust in 
order that buyers are protected in case the project fails.  Consumer 
laws also provide some level of protection for pre-sale buyers from 
significant changes being made by the developer via minimum 
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disclosure requirements.  
A further issue in relation to apartment development is its segmented 
markets. Most apartments built in Australia are aimed either at the 
luxury end of the owner occupier market (where greater margins are 
available) or at investors seeking rental yields in the short term and 
capital gain in the longer term. Both these market segments are 
strongly influenced by the geography and amenity of location, with 
landlords requiring a ready supply of tenants with capacity to pay, 
inclining them towards employment and entertainment rich precincts, 
such as the city centre. Tenants for investor stock seek ready access 
to employment or study nodes as well as entertainment locations so 
as to minimise transport and other living costs. Upmarket owner-
occupiers seek water views, high neighbourhood amenity and so-
called 'lifestyle' attractions. Developers are accordingly very 
conservative in regard to the type of product they will offer and the 
localities they target, as a means of ensuring sales (Kent 2011).  
Although public policy supports apartment development, its 
contribution to housing supply is mainly through large, generic towers, 
with investment low or non-existent in many locations, and with little 
contribution to providing affordable housing solutions to families. 
Much of the risk around apartment development can therefore be 
said to be associated with being able to sell the completed product 
for more than the sum of the costs to produce it. ‘Property 
development is not of itself ‘real estate’ but…a particular state of 
transition or change in form of real estate toward a different state 
with an associated change in potential or real value’ (Drane 2013: 2). 
Old property rights are extinguished (for example, freehold land) and 
new ones created (for example, strata title) (D’arcy and Keogh 2002). 
This transformation is at the core of exchange in the structure of 
provision for apartments, and through the pre-sale process is also at 
the core of the financier’s risk assessment. Demand therefore needs 
to be well ahead of supply in order for the current pre-sale system to 
sufficiently de-risk an apartment development to the point where it 
can proceed. If financiers foresee a glut of apartments or if presales 
cannot be obtained, construction finance is withheld. Supply is 
therefore self-regulating unless easy credit is available. Outside post-
property bubbles and recessions (when there is too little demand), 
locking in demand represents the key development risk. We contend 
that pre-sale contracts represent a sub-optimal solution to the 
problem of locking in demand. The pre-sale process is costly and 
time-consuming, contributing to rising apartment prices and the 
generic product produced in high amenity locations does not supply 
affordable housing solutions for families.  
In this section we have outlined the existing structure of provision for 
apartments in Australia, which is different to the structure of provision 
for detached and other multi-unit housing. Apartment development is 
high risk, capital intensive and reliant on debt funding. Virtually all the 
capital must be expended before any revenues can be obtained. 
Demand therefore is critical and the timing of settlement is crucial to 
the profitability of projects. Finding buyers is often time consuming 
and is expensive, and signifies a search problem, an economic 
problem in need of a solution. Further, Australian consumer law 
dictates pre-sale contract conditions, which neither fully protect the 
buyer or the developer, whose interests can at times differ markedly. 
Something of a square peg in a round hole, pre-sale contracts do not 
address adequately the risk of default at settlement. This draws 
attention to demand as the key development risk, and to exchange as 
a highly problematic component of the structure of provision.  
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We have also highlighted management issues in the structure of 
provision, such as consumer law and property law. It is worth noting 
that the introduction of strata title enabled a new structure of 
provision, primarily because it created a legally defensible property 
right to airspace. Strata title nevertheless did not unleash large 
apartment development in Melbourne. The Transfer of Land Act 
placed a caveat on the pre-sale of strata title properties by requiring 
settlement occur within sixty days of the contract date. That is, 
projects had to be completed so quickly that pre-sales contracts could 
not usefully be employed by developer or financier. In the 1980s this 
requirement was amended to 180 days with the right to an extension, 
thus opening the opportunity for larger construction projects. 
In the next section we provide an overview of development financing. 
This is included for two reasons. Firstly, because public policy debates 
indicate little understanding of the impact of financing and are 
hampered as a result; also because ‘deliberative development’, which 
we describe and advocate later in this paper, is required to confront 




Apartment development typically depends on access to specialist 
development finance. Development finance is a form of project 
finance; a specialised form of lending where individual credit risks are 
assessed and borrowing instruments are structured to deal with 
specific risks of the project (Weaver and Kingsley 2001). The barriers 
to access to development finance are associated with these numerous 
credit risks, the time and cost associated with mitigating those risks, 
and the expected returns in recompense for having taken on and 
actively managed those risks. Access to development finance is 
therefore a significant hurdle to increasing the supply of housing 
(Bryant 2012; PCA 2012; Urbis 2012). 
The complex nature of development finance and the multitude of 
credit risks assessed by lenders are detailed by Weerasooria (1998) 
and Weaver and Kingsley (2001). Developers face lengthy negotiation 
periods with potential lenders, involving extensive information 
exchange about every detail of the project and the borrowers 
themselves in order to establish the developer's credibility with the 
financier and to secure finance to be able to proceed with the project. 
The following are some of the types of credit risks that are addressed 
as part of the application process. 
Appraisal of security to support the borrowing 
Unencumbered security sufficient to cover the loan value is required, 
and financiers place fixed and/or floating charges (i.e. a legal right) 
over the assets offered as security. Security may be provided by way 
of first registered mortgage over the development site and/or any 
other properties or assets owned by the developer. Personal or 
corporate guarantees and/or lien may be required if other security on 
offer is insufficient. Personal guarantees may also be required of senior 
executives and/or the company directors. Typically, a charge is placed 
over the development company (which is often a special purpose 
vehicle established with its own legal entity separate from the 
development's sponsors) and all the supporting documentation for 
the project. This includes everything from architectural plans to the 
pre-sales contracts. Multipartite agreements are negotiated with 
builders and key consultants engaged on the project. This permits the 
financier to step in and complete a project if required. 
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Analysis of the borrower’s capacity to repay 
The borrower must repay the loan at the end of the project via one 
of two methods (or a combination of both) being: from the proceeds 
of sale, or via refinancing. Pre-sales to a value sufficient to cover 
repayment of the loan are generally required. These must be arms-
length pre-sale contracts with full 10% deposits paid, and are 
discussed in greater length shortly. Financiers also analyse the 
developer’s personal and business cash-flow position to assess its 
ability to service the loan and to cover cost overruns if required.  
Independent valuation of project income or project revenue to either 
service the loan or repay in full is also a requirement. 
Appraisal of the borrower’s financial strength 
Due diligence is carried out on the borrower’s assets and liabilities, 
including title searches to confirm ownership of the land and other 
assets offered for security. The overall level of financial gearing of the 
borrower and any associated entities is assessed, as is the lender’s 
overall exposure to the borrower and its associated entities. Due 
diligence is also undertaken on the builder and key consultants. The 
builder must also demonstrate financial strength and show that it will 
not be over-extended by accepting the work. 
Appraisal of the borrower’s integrity 
The financier will assess the business and personal character of 
management and key project personnel, as well as the track record or 
competence of the developer and key personnel in that specific type 
and scale of project, and the borrower’s social and financial stability, 
honesty and reliability. This personal and professional assessment will 
also apply to the key contractors and suppliers associated with the 
project, such as consultants and the builder, to ensure all are good 
credit risks. 
Analysis of key external and internal factors 
The lender may conduct its own research into the market and 
economic conditions in order to assess the likely demand and supply 
factors that will impact the project over the period of the loan. 
Evidence of all statutory approvals is required prior to the release of 
funds for construction. This stage of development is typically funded 
by developer equity so the financier is not exposed to this particular 
risk. 
Loan conditions, such as the loan to value ratio and pre-sales 
requirements will be a reflection of the financier’s risk weighting for 
each of these criteria. Equity is generally sought and must be spent 
prior to debt funding being released. Equity demonstrates the 
developer's financial strength and reduces the risk accepted by the 
financier. Even where credit-worthiness can be established and finance 
approved, the release of funding hinges on the most critical part of 
the development process: obtaining the required pre-sales (Bryant 
2012; PCA 2012).  
The role of pre-sales in lending for apartment development is two-
fold: it confirms market acceptance of the product type and product 
price on offer; and it is a form of security for the financier that the 
project has the capacity to repay its debts (Bryant 2012). Pre-sales de-
risk the financier’s exposure to the project by locking in the future 
revenue stream that will be used to repay the debt. Individual 
purchasers are vetted to establish whether there is risk of default at 
settlement. Depending on the regional market, and the developer, 
financiers may limit foreign investment. The sale of real property is not 
effective until the title is transferred and the balance owing is paid, 
which in the case of new development is when the building is 
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complete. The importance of obtaining pre-sales means developers 
are justifiably conservative about locations and product appeal. 
Pre-sale requirement levels are dictated by the credit conditions of 
the day and the lender’s risk appetite. In broad terms, if a developer is 
building 100 apartments, and the financier is providing 60% of the 
funding, the financier will require 60 of the 100 apartments are sold 
prior to releasing funding, in effect 'guaranteeing' the repayment of 
the loan, the interest and fees. The sale of the remaining 40 
apartments must recoup the developer’s equity and return on that 
investment (profit). 
Pre-sale campaigns involve a significant investment from the developer 
– up to 10% of project costs – making it more expensive than the 
finance. Campaigns include: constructing and operating display units; 
marketing materials; real estate agents to handle sales; newspaper, 
magazine, internet, television and radio advertising; home shows and 
trade delegations. Because investors rather than owner-occupiers are 
the bulk of the purchasers, the 6% commission paid to financial 
planners is also a significant cost.   
Some of the very large high-rise developers employ their own sales 
staff and maintain offices in key markets to avoid such high costs. 
Some developers are moving to soft marketing approaches, using 
social media and web-based advertising and recruitment, for example, 
to reduce costs and increase the cost efficiency of the campaigns. The 
latter suggests the market is moving in the direction of internet-based 
selling models. The cost of pre-sales is significant and is generally 
overlooked by both industry and policymakers advocating measures 
to make housing more affordable. 
For purchasers, committing to buy ‘off-the-plan’ is far from risk free, 
reflecting the fundamental riskiness of developing volumetric airspace. 
Pre-sale involves the purchaser signing a contract of sale with the 
developer prior to the property having its own certificate of title or 
even having been built. Pre-sale requires the payment of a maximum 
10% deposit by the purchaser and, in order to protect the purchaser, 
is held in a trust account. Australian Consumer Law now also requires 
all statutory approvals to be in place prior to commencing the pre-
sales campaign. In the past, developers ran their pre-sales campaigns 
concurrently with obtaining approvals, saving them considerable time 
and hence money. If the final approvals altered the project, and the 
purchasers were dissatisfied, they had no recourse. 
In short, pre-sales are a clumsy legal means of effecting a transaction 
that has a significant temporal delay before it can be finalised. This 
delay and the associated risk means there are considerable 
'transaction costs' which are passed through to the consumer. It is 
also a process that generates negative externalities, such as 
speculation. 
Finally, financiers expect developers to seek a return on the 
investment that is commensurate with the risks, typically a minimum 
rate of return (profit) of 20% on costs. On an annualised basis (the 
time value of money) this 20% return is modest (e.g. a four year 
project means 5% per annum). Actual profits cited were generally 
between 25% and 30% and sometimes higher. Very substantial profits 
can be made when prices and market conditions are rising, as 
developers are able to capture the uplift in land value, hence the role 
of speculation in property development. Peiser and Hamilton (2012: 
13) referring to the US suggest that developers expect to earn 20% 
per year, but that only 3% of this is the margin they take on costs. The 
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remaining 17% accounts for inflation and the risk premium. The 
premium is the cost of poor coordination between the supply and 
demand sides of the market. The financier’s requirement for a 
minimum level of profitability is important in the context of the supply 
of affordable housing. It means that if a commercial developer were 
to propose reducing their profit in order to provide more affordable 
housing, they would be unlikely to obtain finance. 
The development finance fundamentals highlighted here help to 
explain why the inability to obtain development finance, particularly in 
the apartment sector, is cited as one of the key constraints to housing 
supply, despite strong demand fundamentals (Access Economics 
2010). 
 
Demand, supply and price 
Economic theory tells us that strong demand for a commodity and 
high prices should result in new supply-side entrants and an expansion 
of supply of the commodity until demand is met and prices decline 
(Adams et al. 2008: 19). This understanding implicitly informs much of 
the debate on housing supply and affordability in Australia. Policy and 
market analysis almost invariably follows the assumption that if input 
prices for housing can be lowered, housing would be more affordable; 
hence the ongoing debate on taxation and planning regulation, and 
secondly, that new supply will lower prices. 
This view assumes that housing supply comes onto the market on a 
cost plus (competitive) margin basis, whereas new housing stock in 
fact comes onto the market reflecting prevailing prices (Berry 2010; 
Wing, Norman and Orsmond 2012). Cost savings, such as those 
achieved through construction innovation or planning deregulation, 
are not passed through to the consumer but accrue to the developer. 
There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, there is the oligopolistic 
structure of the development industry (Coiacetto 2009). Second is 
the impact of project timing. 
Pre-sales lock in the price of the apartments subject to the pre-sale 
quota imposed by the financier, but the cost of the development 
remains subject to change, with cost overruns a risk at the 
construction stage. Accordingly, pre-sale buyers are unlikely to be the 
recipient of any savings (savings may be made by this stage but profits 
are still forecast rather than actual), or competitive discounting. This 
will be because, while financiers demand a certain level of pre-sales, 
the basis of their assessment of project viability will be an apartment 
price that delivers the forecast profit. If presales are slow and there is 
a looming glut financiers will withdraw their offer of finance and the 
project will not proceed until conditions improve. 
If discounting of apartment prices occurs for apartments it is for those 
not subject to the pre-sale quota, and the discounting is intended to 
reduce the risk of having distressed assets. That is, to shift apartments 
in a slow market. Nevertheless, these apartments (in a rising market) 
embody uplift in value that pre-sales forego. It is logical, if not an 
imperative for speculative developers to retain any savings that may 
have been created in the development process through to the end of 
the process when their financial vulnerability is greatest. Where cost 
savings are important, however, is in terms of project viability (that is, 
in ensuring projects are financed and can proceed); but potential costs 
savings do not directly affect housing affordability under speculative 
supply conditions. 
Increasing supply in order to reduce prices faces a fundamental 
problem. Speculative developers build housing assets in order to sell 
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them. To obtain finance there needs to be independent verification 
that sufficient demand exists that will enable a project to proceed and 
realise a minimum level of profit. When demand periodically slows, 
reflecting the boom-and-bust cycle that is a feature of property 
markets, production stops. Financiers switch investment classes and 
developers put their plans on hold. If the timing is particularly bad, and 
developers are left holding stock they cannot liquidate, the result may 
be bankruptcy. Over-supply of apartments (and hence heavy price 
discounting), when it occurs, is generally the result of an over-supply 
of credit (such as existed prior to the global financial crisis) and an 
unanticipated drop in demand. When credit is not so easily obtained, 
the system, while imperfect, is in effect self-regulating and is 
characterised by chronic under-supply. 
The current economic problem is the failure to match supply and 
demand efficiently. The quest for an orderly and de-risked housing 
supply model should be an objective of public policy. In the next 
section we focus on the planning system. While we argue that 
planning is subject to too much attention in relation to housing 
affordability, the structure of provision analysis indicates that there are 
flaws in the planning system, which need to be rectified. 
 
Apartments and planning 
Victoria has a laissez-faire planning regime, especially in the central city 
area, which is designed to promote capital investment. Floor space or 
plot ratios have not existed as a development control tool in Victoria 
since 1999, and while building height limits apply in many areas, in 
practice these are treated in the application process as a negotiable 
factor. As the market has increasingly sought to invest in residential 
products, one argument mounted by those with an interest in keeping 
restrictions on site yield to a minimum is that this helps keep 
apartments affordable. However, this policy has unintended 
consequences that fuel speculation to the detriment of affordable 
housing supply. Permitting greater yields on redevelopment sites 
pushes up the price of land in the vicinity, because the vendor 
expectation of future yield is raised, thus negating any cost saving for 
future projects. At the same time, existing redevelopment sites tend 
to go back onto the market as landholders seek to capture the uplift 
in site value and exit the project in a risk free manner (Woodcock et 
al. 2011).  
Assuming these existing development sites are purchased by 
developers genuinely intending to build upon them, these new project 
proponents often find themselves with sites literally too risky and/or 
expensive to develop (Rowley and Phibbs 2012). With the increased 
yield potential capitalised into the land price, only an additional 
increase in apartment prices (that is, an increase in the capacity and 
willingness of consumers to buy) or decrease in construction or other 
costs will permit the project to be viable and gain finance. The larger 
scale of the development creates a further risk, as this potentially 
limits who will buy into it. Large apartment towers, for example, are 
highly reliant on specific tenure cohorts, such as student renters. This 
market has been described as having no 'natural buyers', in that only 
around 20% of apartments in large towers are purchased by owner-
occupiers. 
'Activity Centres' should attract apartment developers but the 
demand for their product at the price at which they can supply has 
often been insufficient in many nominated development zones 
(Newton and Glackin 2014). Nor are they going to compete with 
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small developers for suburban residential sites, as the margins are too 
slender. Only where yields can be increased significantly are they likely 
to be interested. The difficulty of encouraging or redirecting 
development to designated activity centres or preferred development 
zones was noted in the Melbourne 2030 Audit (p. 37), as was the 
problem of achieving a supply of more affordable housing (pp. 59-60). 
The result of the current structure of housing provision is that 
planning alone will not deliver desired built forms and uses. But it 
does have an important role. 
While it may appear counter-intuitive, density restrictions in the form 
of planning controls that limit the yield available from re-development 
sites, such as height limits, floor space ratios or bedroom quotas, may 
be effective in dampening speculation and creating a positive 
environment for more deliberative housing development. In essence, 
planning controls can do the opposite of deregulation by creating 
certainty: certainty about what the site is capable of yielding. With 
greater certainty, risk is reduced and the project has an increased 
likelihood of obtaining finance and proceeding as proposed. Further, 
landowners will moderate their expectations of capturing any future 
uplift in value once the development capability of the site is known 
and fixed. The need for increased housing supply as well as 
affordability requires certainty in the planning process to remove 
speculation from the development process.  
In ‘greyfield’ suburbs, restrictions on yield to prevent over-
development can be offset by reconfiguring existing housing lots 
through aggregation (Newton and Glackin 2014) to enable precinct 
scale regeneration. Moderate height increases and better use of 
airspace can maximise design outcomes and optimise land use while 
retaining amenity. For example while two-storey terrace housing can 
be sustainable and affordable, stacking dwellings on top of each other 
alleviates the need for internal staircases potentially permitting more 
dwellings without a corresponding increase in site coverage or density. 
A new structure of provision, based on deliberative development and 
use of volumetric airspace can be the means of increasing affordable 
supply in the suburbs and in many activity centres. Indeed, existing 
developers may benefit from this new deliberative development 
model, transforming their business models to fee-driven service 
providers, rather than profit driven speculators and risk managers. 
 
Practical and policy implications 
The structure of provision for apartments has several implications of 
relevance to public policy objectives for planning and housing. As 
discussed, current urban development and housing supply models are 
not able to achieve the strategic redevelopment of ‘greyfield’ precincts 
required for regional transition to sustainable urban form (Newton 
2010), while existing processes of residential intensification are both a 
cause and effect of declining housing affordability. 
Market conditions required for development of brownfield land to be 
viable result in a number of unsustainable outcomes. Inner urban and 
waterfront sites—in effect ‘global places’ (Dovey 2005)—are 
developed intensively as high rise, high density and have high carbon 
footprints, while middle ring and outer urban sites are frequently 
under-realised in terms of dwelling yield, as land development models 
typical of greenfield sites prove the most viable and profitable.  
There is also a disjuncture between the housing being supplied and 
the housing that is needed and current systems of provision are 
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unlikely to ameliorate this. Demographic trends in household 
formation have raised questions about the appropriateness of housing 
stock, both the existing and that which is being built, to suit future 
housing need (NHSC 2010: 20). It is also forecast that the ageing of 
the population will likely reveal a shortfall in housing that is both 
physically suitable and appropriately located to service a substantial 
cohort of elderly residents (NHSC 2010: 136 ff.; Major Cities Unit 
2010: 98). In addition, it has been noted by some in the development 
industry that the dynamics of the housing market work against ageing 
home owners in many locations being able to take action themselves 
to secure more appropriate housing (Pradolin 2009). 
A growing shortfall of well-located affordable housing meanwhile is 
widening the supply gap between the shrinking social housing sector 
on the one hand, and the increasingly costly (relative to income) 
owner occupied stock on the other, affecting new household 
formation (Chandler 2010: 4). The result is a substantial latent 
demand for housing that remains unmet while the development 
industry responds largely to demand from investors. 
There are also implications for apartment design. Because much of 
the current supply of apartments is marketed to investors, this drives 
the commodification of apartments as ‘products’ tailored to suit 
specific ‘price points’ in the investor market. This in turn has the effect 
of focusing design innovation to the service of this end rather than to 
addressing creatively the housing needs of occupants or in response 
to strategic urban and housing issues. It also reduces the diversity of 
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A New Paradigm 
Disruption and the sharing economy 
Apartment developers commence projects assuming buyers will be 
found and are as such ‘speculative’. Given the demand-side risk, 
speculative developers accordingly produce generic product, with 
intending owners and occupiers able to exert little influence over the 
market in terms of design, amenity or quality, unless at the luxury end 
of the owner-occupier market. However, where consumers 
themselves have collectively assumed the role of the developer they 
have been able to internalise the developer margin, thus making 
significant cost savings and achieving other collective ambitions, such 
as higher environmental performance and tailored designs.  
This ‘deliberative’ development model, increasingly popular in 
Western Europe and not without precedent in Australia, typically 
delivers cost savings of 25-30% compared to equivalent speculative 
development. This compares extremely well to existing policy 
measures aimed at improving supply and affordability. Deliberative 
development can also deliver improvements in amenity, sustainability 
and urban design, making it compatible with a more deliberative 
planning process. 
Deliberative development goes a significant part of the way towards 
addressing the need for presales and the cost and risk in finding 
buyers. We argue, given the savings and other benefits, deliberative 
development should become a new, competitive force for housing 
innovation in Australia. The innovation proposed here to achieve 
scale and equitable access for deliberative development can also 
address exchange problems at a more systemic level.  
 
This is tantamount to a re-design of the market itself. Two-sided 
matching markets, in which two pools (one each on the supply and 
demand sides) that aggregate the actors on both sides of the market, 
and a formal market manager, are created to match supply and 
demand more efficiently. Formal membership shifts the task of finding 
pre-sales from one that is akin to looking for needles in a haystack to 
one that is more like shooting fish in a barrel. This two-sided matching 
market model is the basis of much of the new E-commerce, such as 
Uber and AirBNB. Known as the ‘sharing’ economy because it relies 
on cooperation as much as competition, the ‘disruptive’ nature of this 
type of innovation is often hailed as significant. 
 
Re-designing the market for apartments 
Earlier in this paper we outlined the key economic problem 
encountered in the development of property for apartments. 
Specifically, there is difficulty in coordinating supply and demand, with 
the vagaries of the demand side representing a very considerable risk. 
Finding buyers is both difficult and expensive. To complicate matters 
the requirements of Australian Consumer Laws, intended to protect 
consumers buying apartments off the plan, not only inadequately 
protect these consumers from changes the developer may seek to 
make after the pre-sale contract is signed but also fail to protect the 
developer if the buyer does not proceed to settlement. The market 
puts a price on these risks with financiers requiring projects seek a 
compensating level of return on capital. Typically, such returns are 
only possible if uplift in land value can be captured. These risks 
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reinforce the oligopolistic structure of the industry, narrow the type of 
product offered and the locations in which development is feasible. 
These are costly economic issues identifiable using mainstream 
economic analysis. Mainstream economics is less useful, however, in 
offering a solution. This occurs because economics traditionally 
focuses on competition as the force that increases productivity. The 
Internet however has changed that, and the rise of the so-called 
‘sharing economy’ as the term suggests hints at cooperation as a key 
strategy for enabling improved productivity in many markets, or in 
bringing new markets into existence. While the Internet provides the 
communications infrastructure to reduce search costs, the growth in 
computational power and the application of the principles of ‘Market 
Design’ theory have provided the backroom capacity and theoretical 
basis for new modes of exchange.  
 
Market design 
Market Design is a branch of game theory, a field of economics that 
examines the strategic decision-making of intelligent, rational actors. 
According to game theorists markets have ‘rules of the game’: if the 
rules provide the right incentives, economic actors, behaving rationally, 
will follow these rules in order to maximise profits. However, as 
rational actors they will also subvert the rules where the incentive to 
do so exists. In effect Market Designers recognise that markets exist 
within existing social structures, including for example political and 
legal systems. This differs from the neo-classical understanding of 
markets, which posits markets as without rules or ‘free’, and as 
perfectly competitive.  
Game theory points to how rational economic actors respond to the 
incentives provided in specific scenarios, arguing that they will 
cooperate if there is an advantage in doing so (Myerson 1991). Game 
theory has become an important way of understanding 
monopolisation and collusion, with Market Design emerging as a 
means of fixing markets to promote competition, or ‘creating markets 
where there were none’ (Roth 2007: 1).  
Market Design brings renewed attention to critical issues, which 
Milgrom (2011:  311-319) outlines as:  
§ Product definition – what is the commodity and how should it be 
defined? 
§ Messages – how do participants communicate within markets? 
§ Incentives – the trade-offs between the incentives provided for 
truthful reporting 
§ Linkages among markets – how trade in different goods are linked. 
Product definition is important in the context of supply of affordable 
apartments. Currently, apartments are produced as commodities 
(with investors making up around 80% of sales), rather than as homes 
for owner-occupiers. This means investors are the target of 
‘messages’. Communication is largely one-way (there is much 
advertising) but few would-be owner-occupiers have the opportunity 
to communicate their preferences. As we have already mentioned 
and will return to shortly, lack of information disclosure and 
truthfulness is a multi-faceted problem. Finally, how trade in different 
goods are linked draws our attention to how apartment development 
is a means by which land speculation can be realised (reflecting how 
housing and land are commodified), and how this speculation is highly 
detrimental to housing affordability. These issues draw our attention 
to how this market is ‘wrong’, and why it needs to be ‘fixed’. 
Making apartments affordable 
Sharam, Bryant & Alves    20 
Taking the understanding of markets as embedded in wider 
structures, Market Design posits markets as ‘constructions’ that have 
been designed and which have rules that evolve over time in 
response to the economic environment (Roth 2002). This 
presupposes that there is no single market design or construction. 
This too is a departure from neo-classical economics, which suggests a 
(simple) universal design.  
For our purposes we focus on a specific design, ‘two-sided matching 
markets’: 
One of the main functions of many markets and social processes is to 
match one kind of agent with another: e.g. students and colleges, workers 
and firms, marriageable men and women. […] A market is two-sided if 
there are two sets of agents, and if an agent from one side of the market 
can be matched only with an agent from the other side. (Roth, n.d.) 
Ideally in a matching market no agents should be left on opposite 
sides of the market that were not matched to each other but would 
both prefer to be. Marriage is the most often cited example of a two-
sided market.  Just as matchmakers are used to connect potential 
marriage partners, two-sided matching markets rely on a market 
manager or clearinghouse to coordinate agents on both the demand 
and supply sides (Roth 1984). Matching markets differ from the neo-
classical understanding of markets through having this ‘visible hand’ of 
the market, which plays a key role in aggregating the agents on both 
sides of the market who are required to formally hold membership of 
the market itself. In effect, the market has a boundary. This explicit 
membership and aggregation into a demand-side pool and a supply-
side pool resolves the critical issue of the search. In many matching 
markets the actual matching is dependent on algorithms to process 
preferences to make the matches. The algorithms required for this 
process started being developed well before the advent of the 
Internet (with the most significant contribution by Gale and Shapely 
(1962)). The insights of their work were progressed to create a 
matching market in live-human kidney donation (in the mid 2000s) 
and intern placements in the US (in the early 1990s) and are currently 
being investigated for kidney donation programs and child care 
placement in Australia (Centre for Market Design 2014) 
For a properly functioning two-sided matching market there are three 
prerequisites: ‘Thickness’, ‘Safety’ and a lack of ‘Congestion’ (Roth 
2007; Gans 2012). The first, thickness, refers to the need for a large 
number of buyers and sellers so that satisfactory outcomes for both 
sides of the transaction are enabled. Essentially there must be plenty 
of activity to make membership worthwhile. The second condition is 
that the participants must be safe. Success is highly reliant on both 
buyers and sellers having the confidence and incentive to reveal or act 
on the information they hold. ‘When a good market outcome 
depends on disclosure, as it often does, the market must offer 
participants incentives to reveal some of what they know’. That is, 
people need to believe ‘transactions will actually take place on the 
terms agreed’ (Gans 2012). Finally, the market needs to avoid 
congestion. Transactions need to be conducted efficiently and quickly, 
‘giving participants enough time – or the means to conduct 
transactions fast enough – to make satisfactory choices when faced 
with a variety of alternatives’ (Roth 2007: 2). 
The Internet, computers and algorithms have been critical in achieving 
the requisite efficiencies to avoid congestion in newly emerged 
markets such as Uber, the peer-to-peer the car ride service that 
matches people seeking a lift to those offering one. The issue of safety 
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is critical, both in terms of the monetary aspects and also for personal 
safety, and property protection for services such as AirBNB. But 
neither of these services would be successful without large, active 
memberships that ensure services are available whenever demanded 
(thickness).  
 
A Smart Housing Market 
Returning to apartment development, lack of information and 
information disclosure is an impediment to the proper functioning of 
the market: 
In real estate and construction…information is often relatively poor quality 
and expensive, if not impossible, to acquire…knowledge is fragmented and 
information in many real estate and construction contexts is asymmetric 
between parties to negotiations and exchanges, in the sense that one 
person or agency knows something that another does not and often has 
no incentive to reveal what it is…it can be said that real estate and 
construction processes are associated with much private knowledge rather 
than with a prevalence of public information that is available to all at low 
cost. Information and its lack consequently are likely to have considerable 
impacts on the organisation of activities.’ (Ball 2008: 13-14) 
Creation of a formal matching market for new apartments (what we 
call a ‘Smart Housing Market’ (SHM)) would require buyers and 
developers to reveal their information, not just to identify matches but 
also to establish reputations that can foster trust between the parties.  
Indeed a SHM would permit information being accessible to the 
market that is not currently obtainable, for example, buyer indication 
that they will be actively looking to purchase in two years time.  
Tactical withholding of information exacerbates problems associated 
with pre-sales, rendering the pre-sale process unsafe. The buyer, as a 
rational agent, has strong incentives in certain circumstances to avoid 
settlement, and the developer is incentivised in some circumstances 
to abandon projects (such as when finance is withdrawn). If both 
buyer and developer were more certain that settlement would take 
place as agreed, much of the development risk would be removed.  
Greater disclosure, and more attention to consumer preferences 
would enable better alignment of interests.  
What would constitute thickness in a SHM? Experimental economic 
analysis by market designers would need to be undertaken to 
ascertain the requisite number of buyers, sellers and transactions 
needed to ensure participants are more satisfactorily served than by 
the current model. As housing is often purchased only once or twice 
in a lifetime there would be a high dependency on recruiting new 
buyer/members, who presumably would be attracted by the superior 
outcomes obtained by previous buyer/members. It is easy enough to 
envisage the SHM being successful if a large majority of the existing 
market actors participated. However, how small could it be, and is 
there room for competition? These questions cannot be answered 
here. 
Congestion in relation to the SHM is less likely to be a result of 
inadequate information and communications technology than for 
those markets where there are a high number of transactions. Client 
relationship management would be central and would probably need 
to be relatively individualised and hands on. Development by 
definition has significant timing issues and buyers would still probably 
need to wait for the right opportunity (and even be subject to ballots 
where there is over-subscription) and then wait for project 
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commencement and completion. Rather than being a highly 
automated system a SHM is likely to be a hybrid of technological 
interactions and human engagement. Even where there are not a 
great number of transactions, the need to deal directly with buyers 
and sellers could result in delays that mean there is drop out. The 
benchmark however is the current system, which offers very little 
choice to buyers.  
The potential for aggregation of buyers to provide savings and greater 
choice has been recognised by the market and is the thinking behind 
internet-based services like Citiniche, a housing supply/demand 
aggregator recently established in Melbourne. Founder Ivan Rijavek 
(2013) argues development risk and costs can be reduced and 
affordability improved by matching housing demand to supply in a 
more direct way. Citiniche is however a tentative step and it remains 
to be seen whether it will achieve these aims.  
We have examined the economic problems associated with the 
current apartment development model, which manifest as high search 
costs, elevated risk and inadequate competition. Mainstream 
economics is well able to identify such problems. However, it is when 
Market Design is applied that the significance of these problems is 
concretely revealed. Whilst unexplored within housing studies, and 
the social sciences more generally, Market Design provides the 
underlying transformative economic framework for the many new 
business models that have emerged since the advent of the Internet. 
Just as mainstream economics commonly forms a theoretical 
foundation for social science inquiries, Market Design can be expected 
to add depth to both empirical and theoretical understandings of the 
structures of housing provision. 
 
Deliberative development 
Housing supply innovation requires economic actors who are able to 
commit to the supply of affordable housing and the most obvious 
candidates are consumers themselves. ‘Deliberative development’ is 
where a group of intending owner-occupiers becomes the proponent 
of an apartment development in place of the developer. Such ‘self-
build’ apartments, can deliver better quality and design of housing, 
together with cost savings (Lloyd et al. 2015). Deliberative 
development in Germany has demonstrated consistent savings and 
better housing product (Ring 2012). In Germany, ‘self build’ or 
Baugruppen projects have been delivering apartments at around 75% 
of the market cost for many years (Lloyd et al. 2015; Ring 2012). 
Unlike speculative-based developments, these dwellings are tailored 
to suit the diversity of households involved and embody other 
collective ambitions, such as higher environmental performance.  
Once the development is completed, individuals have title to their 
own dwelling with common property managed by the equivalent of 
an owners’ corporation (deMaddalena and Schuster 2005).  
Architects specialise in providing design services, project management 
and support for collective decision-making. Some German 
governments actively facilitate deliberative development by 
designating state-owned land for development in this way, and 
subdividing appropriately sized lots in brownfield redevelopment 
precincts (de Maddalena and Schuster 2005).  
In Australia, there is one publicly evaluated example of deliberative 
development (undertaken in Fremantle, Western Australia), which 
demonstrated cost savings similar to the German cases (Dolin et al. 
1992). Completed at the same time as a conventional speculative 
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development next door, the property value of the deliberative 
development has since far outstripped the value of the neighbouring 
speculative apartments (Geoffrey London 2012, personal 
communication). A more recent study, examining whether 
deliberative development would be able to obtain development 
finance, noted the limited extent of deliberative development in 
Australia to date reflected considerable financial barriers, but 
concluded these barriers could be addressed if support was provided, 
with the community housing sector being one logical collaborator to 
overcome equity and loan security requirements (Sharam et al. 2015). 
Deliberative development overcomes both the search problem and 
the inadequacy of the pre-sale contract in confirming commitment to 
proceed. As development cooperatives or syndicates, deliberative 
development requires that buyers become project proponents, so the 
group must be formed and formalised as a legal entity prior to land 
acquisition. In the absence of a SHM, it is likely these groups would 
reflect existing affinities, interests, or social status. This in turn is a 
social process that acts to bind the members together and increases 
their commitment to the project. Further, as households seeking a 
home, they are psychologically invested in the project, unlike investors 
who mainly seek capital growth and, as indicated, are willing to forfeit 
deposits if the financial returns of their purchase look shaky at the 
point of settlement. Moreover, as proponents, deliberative developers 
are required to provide equity rather than a pre-sale commitment, 
although financiers view this contribution as though it were a pre-sale 
(Sharam et al. 2015). Speculative developers in Australia, on the other 
hand, are required to hold pre-sales deposits in escrow, so these 
deposits are not regarded as equity. Each member of the deliberative 
development cooperative is legally liable for the cooperative so has 
the incentive to ensure the project is successful. Members, rather than 
walking away from projects, would need to sell their share in the 
cooperative. Again, aggregation, through having a waiting list of buyers, 
provides some degree of insurance when members need to make 
unplanned exits from schemes. 
 
Innovation in financing 
As indicated earlier, deliberative development also requires financing. 
We found that development financiers are willing to consider such 
projects but their financing parameters, for equity and security in 
particular, make it difficult currently for moderate-income households 
to pursue the deliberative model. 
We found that financiers would expect deliberative development 
proponents to contribute between 25% - 40% equity to a project, 
would impose a loan to value ratio (LVR) of 65%, and require the 
project to deliver a 20% profit on costs. Provision of security is a 
difficult issue, as non-home owning households tend to have few 
assets they can use as security. Financiers were very concerned about 
reputational risks if the bank were forced to foreclose on a project. 
More optimistically, the financiers view such a project has having 
100% of pre-sales (Sharam et al. 2015). 
An LVR of 65% has implications for the equity requirement. Assuming 
a total cost per apartment of $400,000 and a hypothecated profit 
margin of 20%, a market valuation upon completion would need to 
be at least $480,000 ($400,000 x 120%). An LVR of 65% therefore 
suggests the financier would lend $312,000 ($480,000 x 0.65) of the 
forecast $400,000 construction cost per apartment, thus requiring an 
equity contribution of $88,000 per apartment. The minimum equity 
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contribution in this case (25%) would be $100,000. A deposit for a 
mortgage is 10% or less so this equity requirement and LVR 
represents a significant barrier. The need to reference market value 
(reflecting the probability dwellings could be quickly sold on if the 
banker had to step in) pushes projects to locations with higher land 
value, thus undercutting affordability. 
Financiers suggested the introduction of a guarantor, such as 
government, would result in a more favourable LVR and thus lower 
the equity requirement threshold. An alternative to a government 
guarantee would be access to other asset rich balance sheets. 
Community housing organisations (CHOs) were identified as a 
possible provider. 
CHOs in Victoria, for example, build and manage social housing for 
low to moderate-income households. At June 2013 the Victorian 
community housing sector held $2.5 billion worth of assets with 
interest bearing debt of only $309 million (DTF, 2014). Gearing is 
modest as revenue is limited by the requirement to provide 
affordable rent.  In short, the sector is asset rich but income poor. 
Therefore the balance sheet of a CHO could be used, effectively on a 
fee for service basis, as security for obtaining finance for deliberative 
developers, either via a financial guarantee provided to bankers or the 
CHO borrowing on the behalf of the deliberative developers. This 
would overcome the critical problem deliberative developers have of 
providing sufficient collateral. Fees generated by the CHO from this 
activity could be used to support social housing development and/or 
services.  
Member-owned banks (as funders of social housing) were particularly 
supportive of CHOs playing this role, and could foresee mixed-tenure 
developments (combining deliberative development and social 
housing) with the deliberative development ‘pre-sales’ reducing the 
development risk. In this way, mixed social housing/ deliberative 
developments would reward private house owners willing to have 
social housing tenants as neighbours, with lower housing costs. This 
could also mitigate some community opposition to social housing 
provision, and would achieve the social diversity desired by mixing 
tenures.  Government or philanthropy could establish a guarantee in 
the form of a revolving social investment fund to support this type of 
development.  
Social impact investors are another potential source of funds. While 
their lending criteria are likely to reflect those of mainstream 
development financiers, the remit of social impact investors includes 
social returns on investment. The central issue here becomes risk 
mitigation rather than the cost of finance.  
 
Practical and policy implications 
Fostering deliberative, owner-initiated apartment development could 
usefully serve two broad housing and urban policy objectives: 
Expand and diversify the market for apartment living 
§ Lower the entry threshold for home ownership by avoiding some 
of the costs associated with the current supply-driven market (up 
to 25%), making housing more affordable 
§ Offer a greater variety of dwelling types to prospective home 
owners, including the possibility of family-friendly apartments, and 
enable consumers to make genuine choices 
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§ Enable greater housing diversity within each development through 
opportunities for the individualisation of dwellings and tenure mix 
§ Present a viable option to ‘age in place’ through downsizing 
affordably in a broader range of locations 
Better manage urban growth 
§ Enable residents and local communities to become agents of urban 
consolidation and change, not just its opponents, by increasing 
housing densities in established residential areas by choice rather 
than imposition 
§ Improve the design quality of apartment development by removing 
the short-term sales and profit imperative from the development 
process, allowing use values and other demand-side factors to 
more directly influence outcomes 
§ Help build community and create ‘places’ by putting urban change 
into the hands of people who will have an on-going stake in the 
liveability, sustainability and success of their neighbourhoods 
Without state support, deliberative development projects currently 
face significant barriers. In order to obtain development finance the 
project proponents need to demonstrate expert project management 
and provide evidence of a good construction track record. Consulting 
project managers and/or architects can take on this role of 
coordinating the various consulting professionals in the absence of the 
developer. In Australia these professionals work for developers on a 
fee for service basis and could do the same for the development 
cooperatives. Likewise, appropriately experienced and credentialed 
construction and/or project management firms could be engaged on a 
fee for service basis. 
Important in all this is the role of the ‘market manager’ who oversees 
the smart housing market and in effect brokers the relationships 
between the parties involved. To hold the trust of those parties and 
to ensure delivery of the public benefits that a deliberative 
development process makes possible, this role is best served by being 
situated with a not-for-profit entity. 
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Conclusions 
Following the insights of Market Design, the economic inefficiencies of 
the traditional pre-sales process can be overcome by aggregating 
buyers. This would also provide the opportunity to deliver more 
tailored housing products. The quest for affordable, quality apartments 
requires economic actors who are willing and able to commit to the 
supply of such housing and the most obvious candidates are 
consumers themselves. This understanding has informed international 
deliberative development groups which have established a credible 
track record of reducing the cost of new apartments while delivering 
quality, sustainable homes attractive to owner-occupiers.  
This paper has had two main objectives: firstly, to make explicit the 
current structure of provision for apartments in Australia. This is in 
order to reveal economic problems not typically considered by 
policymakers or innovators in the pursuit of solutions for Australia’s 
urban housing policy dilemmas. These insights are just as relevant for 
many other countries outside Australia. Secondly, this paper proposes 
innovation in terms of how we think about attracting and managing 
demand for housing by making explicit linkages between Market 
Design theory and the traditional structure of provision for 
apartments in Australian cities. In so doing, it describes a pathway 
from the current, near exclusive, reliance on speculative development 
to increase housing supply towards a more deliberative development 
process better suited to the delivery of policy goals and meeting local 
housing needs. 
 
While the intention here has been to find a way of delivering 
apartments that are more affordable and of a better standard, the 
implications may yet be more profound, with the prospect of more 
orderly development practices serving to dampen speculative booms 
and busts. This research seeks to make a contribution to debates 
about affordable housing and sustainable urban development and 
proposes a practical step towards delivering much needed reform to 
housing provision in Australia. 
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